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54
combatants to, push their struggle to the limits of self interest.
55
Free competiAnd continually, the great financial loss is shown.
tion is not limited to struggles between persons of the same class
for the same end, 56 and unfortunate though it may seem, employers
and their employees have a right to fight; where equal rights clash,
may be destroyed and men impoverished, but equity
great businesses
57
is helpless.

LEONARD

B. BoUrIN.

THE "THIRD DEGREE."

Michael Alex was arrested at 11:00 P. M., June 15, 1931, suspected of the murder of a Queens groceryman. He was arraigned
at about 11:00 A. M., June 17, 1931. In the interval of 36 hours,
during which time he was held incommunicado at the police station,
Alex confessed that he was implicated in the murder.
The defendant was tried in the Queens County Court on April
8, 1932. Although the prosecution presented a case containing various points, there was very little evidence to connect Michael Alex
with the crime, excepting his confession to the police, which was, of
course, offered in evidence. On the trial the defendant claimed that
the confession was not voluntary because the police had beaten it
out of him, and he s6ught to introduce evidence to that effect. This
'Supria

note 12, at 448. Justice Holmes in (1894) 8 HARV. L. REv. 1,

(1920) states a principle since then followed in many
cases: that the intentional infliction of temporal damage is actionable unless
some ground of justification is shown, this justification being dependent upon
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS

considerations of policy and of social advantage (Vegelahn v. Guntner). This,
of course, would put the burden upon the boycotter to show a reason acceptable
to the "social temperament" of the judges. A better approach seems to be
suggested in Ware & De Freville, Ltd. v. Motor Trade Ass'n (spra note 34) :
that causing damage to another raises no presumption of unlawfulness and
plaintiff must show that a right or duty has been violated. See INT. JUR.
Ass'N BULL., Vol. 3, No. 3 (Aug., 1934) at 1 et seq.
' Supra note 6.
' Vegelahn v. Guntner, supra. note 20, at 197.
' Gill v. Doerr, sitpra note 15. The peculiar light in which labor cases are
seen, even today, will be more evident when the following question is considered: What judge would have issued an injunction to a storekeeper in 1765
when the Sons of Liberty boycotted merchants selling English goods; or
against the American Federation of Catholic Societies when in 1911 it threatened theatre managers who contemplated giving proscribed performances; or
against the United States government for refusing to accept the bids of a
dealer of Ford cars-thereby depriving Mr. Ford of his property (prospective
business) without due process of law? The labor boycott is no more illegal
or less potent than these were-what would be unthinkable in those cases is
present in the field of labor law because the judiciary is in the habit of granting
injunctions. Yet, where is the distinction?

NOTES AND COMMENT
evidence was excluded. Alex was convicted, but the judgment was
reversed because his evidence had been excluded, and a new trial was
ordered.1
On the second trial the court allowed the defendant to testify
concerning the alleged beating. The jury disagreed and a new trial
was ordered. On the third trial they again became deadlocked. The
defendant was convicted on the fourth trial, but this judgment was
reversed because of an erroneous charge with regard to the deductions which might be drawn from proof2 of the failure of the police to
comply with the law of arraignment.
At present Alex is out on $5,000 bail, awaiting a fifth trial. Up
to the time of his release on bail this man had been imprisoned for
almost three and one-half years.
It requires little meditation to realize the gravity of the situation
reflected by this case. Obviously, there is a serious flaw in the system
which will permit the disposition of a trial such as this to drag along
for years. Although it may be claimed that this delay was caused
by the congestion of our court calendars and for other extraneous
reasons, the fact remains that this case has been tried, retried, appealed,
reversed, and is yet undisposed of because of the vexatious question
which arose upon the confession obtained by the police, and which,
it is claimed, was extorted from the defendant.
There is little or no evidence to indicate what transpired at the
time, and the solution to the problem is dependent upon the testimony
of the accused as opposed to that of the police. It is with a view
toward analyzing the perplexing problems which arise when a confession, secured under these circumstances, is presented to the court,
and to seek a remedy, if there is one, that the following words are
directed. This leads us to an inquiry into that institution erected in
the Police Department, known under many names, the most common
of which is "The Third Degree." This term is not capable of accurate definition, but it can be said to be, and is, for all purposes of this
note-any words, acts or manifestations which are, or tend toward
being, inquisitorial in their nature, which play upon the hopes or fears
of the subject, and which have for their motive the extraction from
the subject, information about himself or others. 3
In the first place, the practice of extorting confessions from suspects, while rarely effecting any beneficial result because of the inadmissibility of the confession in evidence, 4 has provided individuals
'People v. Alex, 260 N. Y. 425, 188 N. E. 906 (1933)

(First Appeal).

'People x. Alex, 265 N. Y. 192, 192 N. E. 289 (1934) (Second Appeal).
'For a discussion of the meaning of the term as it is used at present, see
2 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §851.
IN. Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Laws of 1881, c. 442, amended to
1934) §395; People v. Rogers, 192 N. Y. 331, 85 N. E. 135 (1908) (The test
of admissibility of the statements of a party accused of crime, whether made
in the course of judicial proceedings or not, is whether they are voluntary);
People v. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 384 (1857) (In order to make a confession
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charged with crime with an additional defense. Now nearly every
confession obtained by the police, whether clearly voluntary or not,
is subject to attack on the grounds that it was extorted from the defendant. 5 Thus is raised a question of fact 6 which, under our present laws, is often difficult of determination and which, as in the present case, lays the foundation for needless expense and delay.
Aside from the expense to the state, such practice, rather than
clarifying the facts and making simpler the task of the courts, engenders doubt and clouds the issue. 7 This is because of its dangerous
possibilities, in making it within reason that the confession be false,
the evidence of a man in fear, pain, and torment, whose only thought
is to ease his suffering by telling his persecutors what they want to
hear, namely, an admission of guilt inevitably has its weight with
the jury.8 This result is by no means improbable. An instance of it
is the case of White v. State,9 in which a negro falsely confessed to a
murder because it seemed to him to be the only way to escape his
torturers.
The English Court, in Rex v. Warickshall,1° decided in 1783,
ably stated the reason for the rule of inadmissibility thus:
admissible it must proceed from the spontaneous suggestion of the person's
own mind, free from extraneous disturbing cause).
'People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 429, 159 N. E. 379 (1927) (by Andrews,
J.: "We have often been disturbed by charges of force used in murder cases
to obtain confessions. While on the one hand such charges have become a
standardized defense, on the other at times there may have been a basis
behind them").
'Snpra note 2.
'This is self-evident because of the numerous cases in which this question
has vexed the court. People v. Stielow, 161 N. Y. Supp. 599 (1916) ; People
v. Doran, supra note 12; People v. Druse, 103 N. Y. 655, 8 N. E. 733 (1886);
People v. Phillips, 42 N. Y. 200 (1870).
' Read CHIEF BARON GILBERT, EVIDENCE 137: "This confession must be
voluntary and without compulsion; * * * pain and force may compel men to
confess what is not the truth of facts and consequently such extorted confessions are not to be depended on."
' 129 Miss. 182, 91 So. 903 (1922), where an ignorant negro boy, eighteen
years of age, was arrested and brought to the scene of a horrible murder.
After questioning by the sheriff he was released, because obviously innocent of
the crime. He was retaken by a mob of infuriated planters and plantation
managers, who locked him with themselves in the room in which lay the bloody
corpse of the victim. The white men, all armed, were bent upon getting a
confession. The negro boy, terrified by the show of force and the threats
hurled at him, confessed to his implication in the murder and said that the
motive was robbery. He was importuned to tell where the money was hidden
and when he was unable to do so they tied his hands and threw him to the
ground, and, while a full-grown man stood on his chest and neck, and another
on his feet, he was given the "water cure," which consisted of strangling him
by slowly pouring water into his nostrils. To alleviate this torture the negro
told them that the money was hidden at a certain spot, but upon going to the
exact place they were unable to find it, and he was unable to show them.
Obviously, the tale was false, told by a mind obsessed with but one idea, that
of release from pain. The confession in this case was very properly held
inadmissible.
298, decided in 1783. This rule is practically
10 1 LEACH, CR. C. (3d ed.)
reiterated in People v. McMahon, stpra note 4.
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"* * * but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery

of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable
a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt,
that no credit ought to be given to it, and therefore it is to be
rejected."
There is more to be said against the "Third Degree" than the
difficulties it provokes in the administration of justice. Revolutions
and wars have been fought, and governments overturned because
of the cruelties and inhumanities of those in power. Our own United
States was founded as a protest against intolerable rules and laws.1 '
It is a matter of history that in most countries, up to a few hundred
years ago, inquisition and torture were common utensils of the powerful. Today, in our enlightened civilization, we look upon such practices, in all their forms, with disgust. They are classified variously
as barbarous, medieval, and savage. But, in vain satisfaction at our
supposed freedom from all this, we seem not to realize that while
our laws proclaim us free, our practice belies our laws. 12 Professor
Irvine, in an article in the Cornell Law Review,13 says:
"* * * if the law can be enforced only through a reversion to
savage, or at least medieval methods, there must be something
wrong with the law."
The fact that the practice continues, however, despite the condemnation of the courts, 14 is an indication of the weakness in the system.
A few examples of the different forms of the "Third Degree"
will amply illustrate its reprehensible character: In a recent case in
"'

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,

Preamble.

'Lehman, J., in People v. Doran, supra note 12: "We give lip service to
the rule that no accused may be compelled to incriminate himself.

We point

with pride to the proceedings in our public court rooms where the accused is
scrupulously warned of his constitutional rights and given opportunity to

consult counsel before he avows his guilt. Here the accused was tried before
a just and learned judge, who in all respects conducted the trial in manner

which calls for admiration; but the jury was permitted to receive in evidence a

confession of guilt obtained when the accused was held in custody without
counsel, and without arraignment on any charge, cowering in a cell in the

police station where inducement to avow guilt was afforded by a police officer
wearing a boxing glove, and we are asked to assume that there were no threats
and no violence * * *." And see Lang v. State, - Wis. -, 189 N. Y. 558
(1922).
Irvine, The Third Degree and the Privilege Against Self-Crimination
(1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 167. Professor Frank Irvine is a member of the New
York Bar and was Dean of Cornell Law School.
"'It is true that these practices continue, but it is not for lack of censure.
See People v. Kennedy, 159 N. Y. 346, at 361-2, 54 N. E. 51 (1899) ; People
v. Randazzio, 194 N. Y. 159, 87 N. E. 112 (1909); People v. Trybus, 219
N. Y. 18, at 22, 113 N. E. 538 (1916); People v. Barbato, 254 N. Y. 170,
172 N. E. 458 (1930); People v. Mummiani, 258 N. Y. 394, 180 N. E. 94
(1932).
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New York the inquisitor wore a boxing glove during his interview
with the prisoner. 15 The prisoner, in an Illinois case, was severely
beaten with a rubber hose.' 6 Beating, more or less violent, is the
common procedure in many states. 17 In Arkansas a police official
used a home-made electric chair which shocked the "truth" out of
the suspect.' 8 Solitary confinement is a favorite method of inducing
speech. 19 The most common form, more subtle than the others, but
just as cruel, is the method of protracted questioning. 20 A California
case 21 disclosed the fact that a woman prisoner, in ill health, was
questioned for two weeks, more or less constantly, when her condition was such that she had to remain in bed, and have her head piled
with wet towels to remain conscious. In Enoch v. Commonwealth 22
the defendant was interrogated for 14 hours until 1:00 A. M., during which time he fainted; he was taken to see the body which he
was accused of murdering. He was questioned from early the next
morning until 6:30 P. M., and finally confessed. Fear plays an active role in the police methods: in People v. Rankin 23 a confession
was obtained when the officer told the defendant-"if you do not tell
all you know about the business, you will be put in a dark room and
hanged."
It may be asked why such a ruthless method of law enforcement
persists, despite our laws. This question naturally leads us to inquire
into the purposes of the "Third Degree." Police Chief Corriston,
of Minneapolis, said that the practice of diligently plying the suspect
with questions was very necessary in seeking out all the essential
facts of the crime. He believes that without such a system a much
greater percentage of crimes would remain unsolved.2 4 Professor
Irvine states that the "Third Degree" is practiced for two reasons:
one is to obtain information leading to other evidence, concerning
either the suspect or others who may be involved; and the other is
to 'obtain a confession on which to convict the suspect. 25
"People v. Doran, supra note 12.
" People v. Sweeney, 304 Ill. 502, 136 N. E. 687 (1922).
' Mangurn v. United States, 289 Fed. 213 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923) ; Mathews
v. N. Y. Central & St. Louis R. R. Co., - Ind. App. -, 161 N. E. 653
(1928) ; King v. State, 312 Mo. 91, 278 S.W. 715 (1925) ; People v. Wiener,
248 N. Y. 118, 161 N. E. 441 (1928).
" N. Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1929, at 3.
"State v. Scarborough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1928); People v.
Brockett, 195 Mich. 169, 161 N. W. 991 (1917).
"People v. Clark, 55 Cal. App. 42, 203 Pac. 781 (1921) ; State v. Doyle,
146 La. 973, 84 So. 315 (1924).
'People v. Clark, supa note 20; and see - Mo. -, 242 S.W. 952, 24 A.
L. R. 682 (1922).
141 Va. 411, 126 S.E. 222 (1925).
"2 WHEELER, CR. CAs. (1807) 467.
' In an address at the 17th Annual Meeting of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police, in 1910.
'Supra note 13. Professor Irvine says: "The Third Degree is practiced
for two purposes: one is to obtain information leading to other evidence
tending to a conviction; the other is to extort a confession that can be used
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It is not reasonable to hold that the officers, in adopting this
procedure of extraction, do so because of any particular delight they
might derive therefrom, or because of brutishness in their make-up, 26
but rather it is because it is incumbent upon them to find the criminal and to secure evidence 'sufficient to convict him. It is out of
regard for their duty to protect the average citizen that such means
are resorted to. The reason for such methods is because the laws
at present existing are inadequate, for if they were not, the police
would make use of them. There is no need for this. There is no
valid reason why the laws should not be refrained to cope with the
necessity and thus enable the police lawfully to do their duty.
It remains, then, to examine the laws, to seek in what respect
they are lacking.
The Constitutions of the United States 27 and of New York
State 28 provide that an individual need not be a witness against himself in a criminal case. The Code of Criminal Procedure of this state
embodies the same right as to a criminal action. 29 Section 165 of the
Code of -Criminal Procedure provides that the defendant must be
taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. Section 196
relates to the right of a defendant on arraignment to make a statement, and declares that he may refuse so to do and that this fact
cannot be used against him on the trial. Section 395 makes admissible any confessions of the defendant, regardless of how or where
obtained, save only those made under the influence of fear produced
by threats, or unless made upon the promise of the district attorney
that it would not be used against him. In punishment for violation
of Section 165 of the Code, there is Section 1844 of the Penal Law,
which declares that anyone who delays in arraigning an arrested
person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
It is evident that the intention of the lawmakers in enacting these
statutes was to uphold the American policies of freedom from oppression, fair trial, and the true administration of justice.30 The
question is, do they? In attaining these ends the rights of the people
as a whole should be preserved, and in order that this might be done,
their prosecutors must be enabled to secure sufficient evidence to conin evidence only through the perjury of the officers extorting it. So far as the
first purpose is concerned it may be said that it fails unless the prisoner's
statements turn out to be truthful. In that case the ends of justice in the
particular prosecution may still be subserved; but there remains the great
public evil of permitting officers of the law to resort to unlawful, disengenuous,
and cruel means to achieve their purpose. * * * As to the second purpose,
nothing can be said in its defense unless we are to abandon the results of
experience and receive in evidence testimony of confessions without regard to
the circumstances of the confession or the credibility of the witnesses thereto."
"TRAIN, COURTS, CRIMINALS AND THE CAMORRA (1912) 21. Mr. Arthur
Train was Assistant District Attorney in New York City.
"Art. 5.
Art. 1, §6.
§10.
Supra note 11.
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vict the guilty. Our statutes, in retaining to ourselves fair trial and
true freedom, should not operate in such a manner as to hamper
those whom we have constituted to protect us from our malefactors,
from adequately doing so.31 The rights accruing to the people as a
whole should not suffer in the enforcement of the rights of the individual. On the other hand, care must be exercised to preserve justice to the individual, and to give him as much right as is not inconsistent with the rights of the people.
The Federal and State Constitutions, in the parts referred to
above, 32 and Sections 10 and 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
grant to an accused the right to remain silent in the face of questions
propounded to him by the authorities. In an article in the ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW 3 a few years ago, Joab H. Banton, District Attorney

of New York County from 1922 to 1929, declared that this was the
root of all evil. Mr. Banton stated that the law should provide for
a magistrate to question the defendant concerning the crime, and that
confessions secured by the police, excepting those obtained before this
magistrate should be excluded. He also felt that law itself should
make the suspect talk by providing that his failure to do so could be
used against him. In concluding, Mr. Banton pointed out the justice
in this system, by stating that an innocent man would not hesitate to
talk under those circumstances, but that the guilty one would probably
remain silent; and this would be an additional aid in determining
guilt or innocence. The Annual Report of the Committee on Criminal
Courts, Law and Procedure for 1927-8, 34 of the Association of the
Bar of the city of New York, embodies a succinct paragraph on the
subject:
"For many years there has been a widespread feeling that
the guarantee against self-incrimination was being unwarrantably used for the obstruction of justice. There are many serious students of present criminal conditions who believe that a
departure is required from our fundamental provision against
compulsory self-incrimination and that the Constitution should
be so amended as to permit the arraignment of an accused before a magistrate who may compel him to answer questions
concerning the offense with which he is charged, regardless
of whether such questions incriminate him or not. Among
these highly respected members of our profession who have
made suggestion of such change is Judge Knox of the Federal District Court (citing 74 Pennsylvania Law Review 139)."
From the Committee Report on Criminal Courts, Law and Procedure
for 1927-28, in Year Book of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, p. 235: "* * * resort should not be had to expedients which convert the
law power of the government into an instrument for defeating its own ends."
' Supra notes 27 and 28.
33Joab H. Banton, The Third Degree (1932) 7 ST. JoHN's L. Rxv. 61.
' Supra note 31, at 253.
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This Committee, in the same report,3 5 finds fault with Section
165 of the Code, supra, with Section 1844 of the Penal Law, supra,
and, with reference to New York City particularly, with Sections 272
and 338 of the Charter of that city, which relate to the powers and
duties of the police commissioner and his force. These rules,36 as
laid down pursuant to Section 338 of the Charter, contemplate that
persons arrested shall not be arraigned before magistrates except in
those hours during which magistrates regularly hold court, and they
provide a number of steps that every arrested person must be put
through preliminary to his arraignment. The Committee is doubtful
of the constitutionality of these rules. It feels, furthermore, that the
provisions thereof create many opportunities for the police to "perpetrate those acts of intimidation and coercion."
We feel that Section 395 of the Code 3 is instrumental in creating much of the oppression complained of today because it creates
an inducement to seek confessions.3 8 It is true that it was passed
Supra note 31.
offending police rules referred to are: 300, 301, 302 and 317 of the

'lThe

Regulations. They are as follows:
"300.-Members of the Force will make known the arrest of any
person by taking such person to the station house of the precinct in
which the arrest is made, for search and record; except that on bridges,
the prisoner must be taken to a station house within the court jurisdiction. Intoxicated persons will be taken directly from the place of arrest
to the station house designated for their detention.

"301-If the court is in session the desk officer will, without delay,
despatch the prisoner to the proper court, except as provided in Reg. 317.
"302.-If the court is not in session, and prisoner is not bailed, he
will deliver the prisoner, if a male, into the custody of the station
house attendant, or if a female, into the custody of the matron.
"317.-Personsarrested charged with felony or thievery, professional
thieves and known criminals charged with misdemeanors, will be taken
without unnecessary delay to the precinct detective office for the purpose
of identification. All such persons who have been arrested and are still
in the custody of the police, will be delivered at Manhattan or Brooklyn
Headquarters of the Detective Division, not later than 8:00 A. M. the
next day. At the same time and place will be delivered a copy of the
arrest entry concerning such prisoner, if arrested by other than a member
of the Detective Division."
Supra text.
is a natural consequence inasmuch as the courts have been liberal
in construing this section: A confession is not inadmissible merely because
produced by question and answer, as while the defendant is under arrest, or
because the district attorney did not advise the defendant that it would be used
against him, or because tricks or deception were practiced, if these matters
did not arouse fear as to the result, or the promises do not amount to a
stipulation of immunity by the authority of the district attorney.-People v.
Stielow, 161 N. Y. Supp. 599 (1916).
The conduct of a private detective, employed by the district attorney, in
striking the defendant and in holding him in custody in order to obtain statements from him before a complaint and arraignment, while without legal sanc'This
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because of public feeling that the criminals were treated with too
9
but the effect of it has been actually to prejudice
much kindness,
40
their rights.
The rights of the individual are intended to be saved for him,
by punishing those persons who delay in arraigning him before a
magistrate.4 ' In practice, however, this remedy is a weak one beof the laxity of the public prosecutors (in general) to enforce
cause
it.42 The accused person also has a civil remedy against any officers
who deprive him of his rights, but this, too, is impracticable. The
43
Harvard Law Review, in a recent Note, pointed out the disadvantage in which even an innocent man is placed in the eyes of the jury
when he brings suit against the officers of the law. They further
state that only three such cases appear to have been decided since
1916, indicating that the remedy is very little used.
Briefly, then, the weaknesses and faults found in our laws by
competent authorities, are:
(1) A disability upon the police and the courts, which prevents
them from compelling the accused to testify concerning the crime.
In effect the authorities are unable, if the accused is unwilling, to
ascertain by question and answer even the name of the accused, or
anything else about him.
(2) An inducement to the police to circumvent this disability,
because of the rule of admissibility of confessions. This is an injustice to the accused by laying him open to personal injury.
The creation, because of #1 and #2, of a difficult ques(3)
tion of fact and the danger of faulty judgment consequent thereon.
tion, did not per se make admission of such statement illegal.-People v. Trybus,
219 N. Y. 18, 113 N. E. 538 (1916).
The following is the explanatory footnote to a section substantially the
same as the present §395, which section formed part of the proposed criminal
code (commonly known as Graham's Code) which was presented to the
Legislature in 1850 by the Commissioners in Pleading and Practice:
"There is perhaps no rule of evidence in criminal cases, which has
given rise to more discussions in the courts, than that which relates to
confessions in criminal cases. It is proposed by this section to declare
the rule, so that there may be no more doubt hereafter, and at the same
time to open the door to confessions in many cases where they are now
excluded. The law has been too tender in this respect. It should be its
policy, as -the Commissioners conceive, to let in all the light possible,
trusting to the discretion of juries to distinguish between the false and
true. Confessions, not excluded by this rule, may be given in evidence,
with all the circumstances attending them; and the jury will give such
credence to it, as its own character and those circumstances may justify."
'oSupra note 31, at 243.
IN. Y. PENAL LAW §§1844, 1937.
,"Supra note 31, at 254.
'"Note

(1929) 43
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(4) A resultant inefficiency in prevention and deterrence of
crime, due, first, to the difficulty of the police in getting adequate
information, and secondly, to the loop-holes afforded to accused persons to unreasonably turn the law against itself to their own
advantage.
To remedy the situation, to protect adequately the rights of the
People and those of the individual, various plans have been offered.
Perhaps the most important, and the one to whom most subscribe, is
the proposal to limit the right of an accused to refuse to speak. We
have already mentioned District Attorney Banton's views on that
subject. 44 His plan is to force an accused to speak in his own defense, by providing that his silence shall be an element to be considered by the jury in determining his guilt. This is not coercion,
but common sense. The prisoner's rights are protected by providing
for such an examination before a magistrate, the prisoner's counsel,
and witnesses. The saving clause in this plan, which prohibits the
admission of confessions made in any other manner, fully protects
the accused. By this means the People would be afforded an effective
weapon for finding the truth.
We also have seen how the Bar Association considers this subject. The Committee Report above referred to 45 expresses the
thought that the fundamental weakness lies in our present method of
arraignment, which affords delay and opportunity to the police to
practice the "Third Degree." The Committee feels that much of the
difficulty would be removed by providing for immediate (rather than
"without unnecessary delay") arraignment of all prisoners at a proposed Central Magistrates Court, at any hour of the day or night.
The gist of the remedy in this report is-to remove the inducement
and the opportunity for illegal prosecution, and provide adequate
weapons to the authorities for getting to the truth, and otherwise
bringing the guilty to justice. The report advocates, as an alternative for the above, the adoption of the English rule:
"which among other things prohibits all cross-examination of
a prisoner making a voluntary statement and the putting of
any questions to him except for the purpose of removing ambiguity in what he has actually said." 46
Professor Wigmore subscribes to the English rule.47 He feels
that justice is capably administered in that country without the use,
illegal or legal, of the "Third Degree." This learned jurist feels
that the remedy lies in the method of taking the confession. He says:
"Supra note 33.
'Supra
40 Ibid.

note 31.

,7Supra note 3.
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"In short, let an authorized, skilled magistrate take the
confession. Let every accused person be required to be taken
before a magistrate within a day after his arrest, for private
examination; let the magistrate warn him of his right to keep
silence; and then let his statement be taken if he is willing to
make one."
There are many who feel that the trouble springs, not from laws
or the lack of them, but rather from our American philosophy, which
makes it possible for the authorities to violate the provisions of one
law in the enforcement of another. This contention is expressed by
Edgar W. Camp of Los Angeles, in an address in 1929.48 He points
out the great quantity of legislation that exists for the prevention
of injustice to a person suspected of crime. He says that we have
enough of it now, and that more will not help; that the objective to
be sought for is the enforcement of those laws already in existence.
Mr. Camp concludes with the remark that our existing laws will
certainly be enforced, just as soon as the police and other officials
feel the steady pressure of public opinion.
Undoubtedly this is, at least partly, true. It requires no citation
of authorities to state that Americans are somewhat inclined to take
too slight an interest in the strict enforcement of the law, and in
certain instances there has been a wholesale disregard of it. Our
"prohibition era" is indicative of this fact. It is a strange contrast
to place the English philosophy with respect to obedience of law,
enforcement thereof, and the rights of the individual, in contradistinction to our own. In an article in the Solicitor's Journal, entitled
"Extracting Confessions by Machinery," 49 we find an interesting
British comment on our American principles. This is an article which
takes notice of the tests made in Seattle, a few years ago, to prove
the success of the lie detector (which consisted of a drug injected
into the defendant, and, by the use of a blood-pressure machine, testing and measuring his jumpiness under cross-examination). In declaring its "unthinkableness," the English views on this question are
revealed.
"The injection would be in itself an illegal assault unless
the subject consented to it; so would the application of the
blood-pressure registering machine; and the process of long
and prolonged questioning with a view to induce admissions
of guilt would render the admissions inadmissible in evidence.
* * * It sounds only too much like a refined means of torture. * * *"
'This quotation is in part from an article in Southern California Law
Review: Bates Booth (California Bar, written under the supervision of Prof.
C. D. Whittier, Stanford University Law School), Confessions, and Methods
Employed in Procuring Them (1930) 4 So. CALIF. L. REv. 83.
"English, 73 SOL. 3. 807, Dec., 1929.
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This attitude is again reflected in a memorandum sent by the
Home Secretary of Great Britain to the Chief Constables of England
and Wales, dated June 24, 1930.50 It was written after an investigation which revealed minor discrepancies in methods and policies of
the various Constabularies throughout the United Kingdom. The
tenor of the note reflects the particular care demanded of peace officers in their dealings with suspects, in the matters concerning statements made by the suspects:
"They (the interrogating officers) should bear in mind,
however, the purpose for which these rules were drawn up,
namely, to ensure that any statement tendered in evidence
should be a purely voluntary statement and therefore admissible in evidence. In carrying out their duties in connexion
with the questioning of suspects and others they must, above
all things, be scrupulously fair to those whom they are questioning, and in giving evidence as to circumstances in which
any statement was made or taken down in writing they must
be absolutely frank in describing to the court exactly what
occurred, and it will then be for the judge to decide whether
or not the statement tendered should be admitted in evidence."
But it must be borne in mind that the system and practice in
England, however admirable in theory and in its success, may not be
adoptable in our own country. This is for the reason that our people
are essentially different from the English. For the most part their
population is composed of native born sons, whose ancestry and traditions inspire respect for law and order and one another. In this
country, however, though basically Anglo-Saxon, we are made up of
varying nationalities with diverse traditions and customs, many of
which conflict with others, and which create complications peculiar
to such a potpourri. Furthermore we have to deal with criminals
under the handicap of limited jurisdiction, at least as far as the state
courts and police are concerned. By this we mean the facility with
which a criminal may pass from one state into another, and thus
evade the jurisdiction of the courts of the state in which he committed the crime. In order to regain jurisdiction the process of extradition must be resorted to and this often results in the freeing of a
guilty man. Without going into detail, such limited control diminishes
the ability of the authorities to gather evidence and sometimes renders
it impossible. This difficulty is unknown in the single jurisdiction of
England. For this reason it seems doubly important that we make
use of the opportunity of gleaning evidence directly from one who
is suspected of the crime.
This writer believes that our system, to be truly effective, must
provide our courts and police with the authority and power to get
English, 74 SOL. J. 633, Sept, 1930.
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at the truth. A full disclosure of the facts renders easy the application of the law. To force our prosecutors, in the absence of direct
evidence, to rely upon circumstantial evidence to convict, when the
truth might lie hidden in the breast of the suspect, is an injustice to
the People.
In order to render effective the administration of justice, to see
that the guilty are found and properly convicted, and at the same time
to give an accused as much right as is consistent with the rights of
all, we make the following suggestions, using for a guide the reasons
and arguments in the foregoing review:
(1) Amend the Constitutions of the United States and of New
York State to provide that an accused must testify in a criminal case
or action, if required, concerning his connection with the crime with
which he is charged, and his failure so to do may be considered by
the jury in determining his guilt or innocence.
(2) Amend the Code of Criminal Procedure to be consistent
with #1. 51 Amend it further to make it mandatory that a prisoner
be arraigned immediately after his arrest or as soon thereafter as is
humanly possible; and this does not contemplate "reasonable
delay" for anything other than booking the prisoner at a police precinct. Let the Code provide that the magistrate have power of compulsory examination, in the presence of counsel for the accused and
witnesses, and that the prisoner's silence or evasion of questions thus
properly put may be used against him on the trial that may follow.
(3) Let the Code prohibit the use, by the magistrate or anyone
else, of methods known commonly as "third degree"; and this includes within its scope all acts or words inquisitorial in nature, or
which tend thereto. This contemplates the exclusion of tactics which
are calculated to intimidate the prisoner or to play upon his fears,
and also excludes delusion and trickery.
(4) Repeal Section 395 of the Code, and declare that no confession, of any nature whatsoever, obtained in the manner described
in #3, shall be admissible in evidence.
writer suggests the following:
(1) Repeal that part of §10 which prevents the compulsion of a person
to be a witness against himself.
(2)
Repeal §196 and substitute therefor: "When the examination of the
witnesses on the part of the people is closed, the magistrate must inform the
defendant that he may make a statement concerning the charge against him
(stating the nature thereof). The defendant may waive this right and such
waiver may not be used against him on the trial which may follow, provided
that the magistrate, in his discretion, may require the defendant to give information concerning the crime, in which instance the defendant shall answer to
the best of his ability, and his refusal so to do, or his reluctance, may be used
by the jury in the trial which may follow, in determining his guilt or innocence."
'The
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(5) Revise the Penal Law to comprehensively provide for the
punishment of all who violate any of the foregoing laws. This, ii
order to be effective, should mete out severe penalties for definite
periods of time, rather than as at present, which merely provides for
a maximum fine and/or imprisonment.
(6) Thoroughly revise the police rules of the city of New York
in accordance with the above.
Let it be kept in mind that the rights of
the individual, at
least in so far as concerns the questions herein, should be subordinate to the rights of the people as a whole. The Constitution
is a wise and erudite product of mature thinking, but it is not infallible. We know that the intention of its authors was to create equal
rights for all. Why then did they prefer one who is suspected of a
breach of duty to the whole? To preserve equal rights for all let it
be lawful that this one give an account of himself. This is not unjust
to him, because if he is innocent he has no reason to remain silent,
and his testimony will prove his innocence. If he is guilty his words
will lead to his conviction, either directly by his confession, or indirectly by giving the authorities something on which to work. His
silence, if he chooses not to speak, will point the finger of suspicion
at him, and it is this measure that is relied upon to deter such silence,
and to get at' the facts. As to arraignment, it is necessary, in the
execution of the law, to place our trust in someone. Up to now that
trust has rested in the police, and, according to experience, they have
abused it. Let us, therefore, place it where it should always have
been, on the magistrate, who by education and training at least, is
more qualified than the policeman. And in doing this we will be
taking a step toward the ideal upon which our judicial system was
founded, namely, a speedy and public trial by officers of the state
who are duly appointed to administer the law, without fear that others
will take that power to themselves under
52 circumstances which afford
little protection for the rights of man.
It has been said by many, in reference to the remedy provided
for herein, that it is impractical, because of the great difficulties attendant upon the repeal of either the Federal or State Constitutions.
The writer believes, however, that the difficulties connected with any
'From

the opinion in State v. Thomas, 193 Iowa 1004, 188 N. W. 689

(1922) : "They [the arresting officers] constituted themselves a tribunal unknown to the law, and proceeded without warrant to subject the man to a
secret examination, from which his friends and his counsel were carefully
excluded. They assumed his guilt, and refused to credit his denials and his
protestations of innocence or to accept anything he might say in his own
behalf until they had extorted from him the alleged confession. Such proceedings are without excuse or justification; and to tolerate them or to ignore them
without rebuke is to bring reproach upon the law and to convert the administration of justice into an engine for the perpetration of rank injustice.
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reform have no bearing on the righteousness of the cause. If we
are to be deterred from taking any step in readjusting the rights of
the people and those of the individual, and in so doing more justly
protect both, simply because of the difficulties which would be involved, we might just as well abolish our courts and our legislatures
because their existence would no longer be required.
J. CYRIL O'CONNOR.

